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Abstract	  This	   paper	   analyses	   the	   relative	   influence	   of	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   demand-­‐pull	  policies	   in	   wind	   power	   across	   OECD	   countries	   on	   the	   rate	   of	   innovation	   in	   this	  technology.	   We	   use	   annual	   wind	   power	   generation	   to	   capture	   the	   stringency	   of	   the	  portfolio	   of	   demand-­‐pull	   policies	   in	   place	   (e.g.,	   guaranteed	   tariffs,	   investment	   and	  production	  tax	  credits),	  and	  patent	  data	  as	  an	   indicator	  of	   innovation	  activity.	  We	  find	  that	   wind	   technology	   improvements	   respond	   positively	   to	   policies	   both	   home	   and	  abroad,	  but	  the	  marginal	  effect	  of	  domestic	  policies	  is	  12	  times	  greater.	  The	  influence	  of	  foreign	   polices	   is	   reduced	   by	   barriers	   to	   technology	   diffusion,	   in	   particular	   lax	  intellectual	   property	   rights.	   Reducing	   such	   barriers	   therefore	   constitutes	   a	   powerful	  policy	  leverage	  for	  boosting	  environmental	  innovation	  globally.	  JEL	  CLASSIFICATION:	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1	   Introduction	  
One	   of	   the	   central	   objectives	   of	   environmental	   policies	   is	   to	   foster	   innovation	   in	  environment-­‐friendly	   technologies	   and	   pave	   way	   towards	   ‘green’	   growth.	   Political	  leaders	   across	   countries	   frequently	   argue	   that	   ambitious	   environmental	   and	   climate	  domestic	  policies	  can	  help	  local	  firms	  achieve	  technological	  leadership,	  thereby	  boosting	  the	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   national	   economy	   and	   creating	   jobs.1	   However,	   domestic	  policies	   may	   also	   boost	   innovation	   activities	   abroad,	   and	   thus	   strengthen	   foreign	  competitors.	  Indeed,	  the	  fact	  that	  44%	  of	  the	  applications	  for	  patents	  worldwide	  in	  2008	  were	  filed	  by	  non-­‐residents	  (WIPO	  2010)	  clearly	  indicates	  that	  innovators	  look	  beyond	  national	  borders.	  If	   innovators	   are	   influenced	   not	   only	   by	   domestic,	   but	   also	   foreign	   market	  conditions,	   then	   environmental	   policies	  may	   fail	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   competitive	   advantage	  for	  domestic	  companies.	  This	  concern	  has	  led	  to	  particularly	  heated	  political	  debates	  in	  the	   renewable	   energy	   sector,	   as	   this	   source	   of	   energy	   has	   been	   heavily	   subsidized	  through	   guaranteed	   feed-­‐in	   tariffs	   in	   many	   developed	   countries,	   while	   major	   global	  suppliers	  of	  wind	  or	  solar	  photovoltaic	  equipment	  are	  located	  in	  China	  or	  India.	  Yet	  the	  existence	   of	   cross-­‐country	   policy	   spillovers	   implies	   a	   stronger	   overall	   impact	   of	  domestic	  policies	  on	  global	  innovation,	  and	  thus	  on	  green	  growth.	  A	   first	   objective	   is	   to	   study	   the	   relative	   impact	   of	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   policies	  promoting	  wind	  power	  on	  innovation.	  We	  primarily	  focus	  on	  policies	  that	  stimulate	  the	  deployment	   of	   wind	   power	   capacities,	   such	   as	   feed-­‐in	   tariffs	   or	   renewable	   portfolio	  standards.	   These	   are	   usually	   referred	   to	   as	   demand-­‐pull	   policies	   as	   they	   foster	   the	  demand	  for	  innovation.	  A	  major	  practical	  difficulty	  to	  study	  the	  cross-­‐border	  impact	  of	  demand-­‐pull	   policies,	   however,	   is	   finding	   data	   measuring	   the	   level	   of	   demand-­‐pull	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regulation	   that	   are	   reliable	   and	   comparable	   across	   countries.	   We	   overcome	   this	  difficulty	  by	  using	   annual	  wind	  electricity	   generation	   in	   each	   country	   to	  proxy	   for	   the	  level	   of	   demand-­‐pull	   policies	   for	   wind	   generation.	   We	   also	   examine	   the	   influence	   of	  public	  R&D	  support	  in	  wind	  technologies.	  When	  developing	  a	   technology,	   innovators	   look	   forward	   to	   the	  diffusion	  stage,	  at	  which	  time	  they	  will	  reap	  the	  benefits	  of	  their	  invention.	  Considering	  the	  diffusion	  stage	  is	   thus	   necessary	   to	   understand	   the	   impact	   of	   foreign	   determinants	   on	   innovation.	   A	  second	  objective	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  drivers	  of	  the	  international	  diffusion	  of	  wind	  power	  technology.	  Reasoning	  backward,	  we	  first	  identify	  the	  factors	  driving	  international	  technology	  diffusion	  based	  on	  a	  panel	  dataset	  describing	  the	  cross-­‐border	  transfer	  of	  inventions,	  as	  measured	  by	  patent	  filings,	  from	  28	  OECD	  (inventor)	  countries	  to	  79	  recipient	  countries	  between	  1991	  and	  2008.	  We	  show	  that	  local	  demand	  for	  wind	  power	  exerts	  a	  positive	  influence	  on	  technology	  inflows.	  However,	  barriers	  to	  trade	  and	  lax	  intellectual	  property	  rights	   regimes	   significantly	   hinder	   the	   transfer	   of	   patented	   inventions.	   This	   suggests	  that	  foreign	  demand	  might	  be	  less	  effective	  in	  inducing	  innovation	  relative	  to	  domestic	  demand.	  	  We	   test	   the	   latter	   assumption	   by	   estimating	   the	   relative	   impact	   of	   domestic	   and	  foreign	   demand	   for	   wind	   power	   on	   innovation	   with	   a	   panel	   covering	   the	   same	   28	  inventor	  (OECD)	  countries2	  over	  the	  period	  1991-­‐2008.	  In	  certain	  specifications,	  we	  use	  our	  results	  on	  technology	  diffusion	  to	  weigh	  the	  variables	  capturing	  the	  level	  of	  foreign	  policies,	   the	   idea	   being	   that	   foreign	   demand	   originating	   from	   countries	   with	   lower	  barriers	   to	   diffusion	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   influence	   inventors.	   We	   find	   that	   innovation	  efforts	   increase	   in	   response	   to	  both	   stronger	  domestic	   and	   foreign	  demand.	  However,	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the	  marginal	  effect	  of	  domestic	  demand	  on	  the	  rate	  of	  innovation	  is	  much	  stronger	  than	  that	  of	  the	  foreign	  demand.	  Our	   focus	   on	   wind	   power	   is	   motivated	   by	   three	   reasons.	   First,	   wind	   power	  accounted	  for	  the	  largest	  additions	  of	  renewable	  energy	  capacity	  in	  recent	  years,	  ahead	  of	   hydro	   power	   and	   far	   ahead	   of	   solar,	   geothermal,	   biomass	   and	  marine	   energy	   (IEA,	  2012).	   Second,	   the	   wind	   turbines	   market	   is	   a	   globalized	   market,	   with	   the	   top	   10	  companies	  in	  2009	  based	  in	  six	  different	  coutries,	   including	  two	  emerging	  economies3,	  making	  it	  an	  interesting	  case	  to	  study	  cross-­‐country	  spillovers	  of	  innovation.	  Third,	  the	  competition	  from	  these	  emerging	  economies	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  heated	  policy	  debates,	  in	  particular	  over	  the	  pertinence	  of	  introducing	  measures	  to	  protect	  domestic	  industries.	  The	   topic	   of	   this	   paper	   makes	   a	   contribution	   to	   the	   well-­‐developed	   empirical	  literature	   on	   green	   innovation.	  Most	   studies	   ignore	   cross-­‐country	   policy	   spillovers	   as	  they	   relate	   domestic	   innovation	   to	   domestic	   policies	   (Jaffe	   and	   Palmer	   1997;	  Brunnermeier	  and	  Cohen	  2003;	  Newell	  et	  al.	  1999;	  Popp	  2002;	  Crabb	  and	  Johnson	  2010;	  Johnstone	   et	   al.	   2010).	   Our	   finding	   that	   environmental	   policies	   also	   promote	   foreign	  innovation	  means	  that	  these	  studies	  underestimate	  their	  overall	  impact.	  A	   few	  empirical	  studies	  have	  begun	  exploring	   the	  effect	  of	   foreign	  environmental	  or	   climate	   regulation	   on	   technological	   innovation.	   Their	   conclusions	   are,	   however,	  mostly	   based	   on	   correlation	   analysis,	   which	   may	   not	   provide	   sufficient	   evidence	   of	  causality.	  Lanjouw	  and	  Mody	  (1996)	  observe	  that	  strict	  vehicle	  emission	  regulations	  in	  the	  US	  seemingly	  spurred	  innovation	  in	  Japan	  and	  Germany.	  Popp	  (2006),	  by	  contrast,	  finds	   that	   innovation	   in	   air	   pollution	   control	   devices	   for	   coal-­‐fired	   power	   plants	   is	  positively	  correlated	  with	  stringency	  of	  environmental	  regulation	  in	  the	  home	  country,	  but	  is	  not	  influenced	  by	  the	  stringency	  of	  foreign	  environmental	  regulation.	  Popp	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  examine	  the	  case	  of	  chlorine-­‐free	  technology	  in	  the	  pulp	  and	  paper	  industry	  and	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find	   a	   positive	   correlation	   between	   both	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   regulation	   and	  innovation.	  But	  whether	  these	  results	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  causation	  remains	  an	  open	  question.	  	  In	   a	   paper	   developed	   independently	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   ours,	   Peters	   et	   al.	  (2012)	   analyse	   the	   impact	   of	   foreign	   demand-­‐pull	   policies	   on	   innovation	   in	   the	  photovoltaic	  energy	  sector.	  They	  also	  find	  that	  a	  positive	  and	  significant	  effect	  of	  foreign	  demand	   on	   domestic	   innovation,	   which	   suggests	   that	   this	   pattern	   is	   robust,	   at	   least	  across	  renewable	  energy	  technologies.	  However,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  foreign	  demand	  is	  smaller	  than	  in	  this	  paper.	  Although	  differences	  in	  sample	  and	  in	  explanatory	  variables	  make	   it	  difficult	   to	   compare	   the	   results	  of	   the	   two	  papers4,	   this	  may	  suggest	  that	  barriers	  to	  technology	  diffusion	  are	  higher	  in	  the	  solar	  PV	  than	  in	  the	  wind	  industry,	  which	  is	  a	  relatively	  more	  mature	  technology.	  This	  paper	   is	   also	   related	   to	   the	   literature	  on	   the	   international	  diffusion	  of	   clean	  technologies.	  In	  particular,	  Dechezleprêtre	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  examines	  the	  drivers	  behind	  the	  flows	  of	  climate-­‐related	  patents	  across	  countries.	  This	  paper’s	  approach	  and	  results	  are	  similar,	   but	   whereas	   Dechezleprêtre	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   primarily	   assesses	   the	   influence	   of	  generic	  policy	  variables	  (IPR,	  barriers	  to	  trade	  and	  FDI),	  this	  paper	  looks	  specifically	  at	  environmental	   policy	   variables.	   Dekker	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   uses	   patent	   data	   to	   look	   at	   the	  impact	   of	   the	   Convention	   on	   Long-­‐Range	   Transboundary	   Air	   Pollution	   on	   innovation	  and	   international	   technology	  diffusion.	  They	  show	   that	   signatory	  countries	  experience	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  inflow	  of	  foreign	  patents	  as	  well	  as	  in	  domestic	  innovation.	  Yet	  it	  does	  not	   address	   the	   influence	   on	   innovation	   by	   foreign	   inventors,	   which	   is	   the	   central	  question	  of	  this	  paper.	  The	  paper	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  Section	  2	  briefly	  presents	  the	  recent	  trends	  in	  the	  deployment	  of	  wind	  power	  technology	  at	  the	  global	  level	  and	  discusses	  the	  policies	  that	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support	   this	   deployment.	   Section	   3	   presents	   the	   data.	   We	   explain	   how	   we	   extracted	  patent	  data	  from	  the	  World	  Patent	  Statistical	  Database	  (PATSTAT)	  and	  discuss	  the	  use	  of	  patents	  to	  measure	  innovation	  and	  technology	  diffusion.	  We	  also	  explain	  how	  we	  proxy	  the	  level	  of	  wind	  policies	  and	  present	  descriptive	  statistics	  on	  innovation	  and	  demand,	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  In	  section	  4,	  we	  present	  and	  discuss	  our	  hypotheses.	  Section	  5	  presents	   our	   econometric	   strategy	   and	   results	   on	   the	   international	   diffusion	   of	  technologies.	  Section	  6	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  econometric	  analysis	  of	  innovation.	  The	  final	  section	  summarises	  the	  main	  findings.	  	  
2	   Background	  information	  on	  wind	  power	  The	   wind	   power	   industry	   is	   developing	   very	   quickly:	   between	   2000	   and	   2009,	  installation	  of	  wind	  capacity	  has	  grown	  at	  an	  annual	  average	  rate	  of	  30%	  at	  the	  global	  level.	   This	   corresponds	   to	   a	   doubling	   of	   capacities	   every	   three	   years.	   Globally,	   wind	  turbines	   produced	   340	   terawatt-­‐hours	   (TWh)	   of	   electricity	   in	   2009,	   representing	   less	  than	  2%	  of	  total	  electricity	  generation.	  In	  a	  few	  countries,	  however,	  high	  levels	  of	  wind	  power	  penetration	  have	  been	  achieved.	  These	  include	  Denmark	  (20%	  of	  total	  electricity	  production),	  Portugal	  and	  Spain	  (14%),	  Ireland	  (11%),	  and	  Germany	  (8%).	  	  	   The	  cost	  of	  generation	  associated	  with	  wind	  technology	  remains	  high	  relative	  to	  the	  conventional	  fuels	  used	  for	  power	  generation,	  although	  this	  might	  change	  in	  the	  near	  future	   as	   costs	  have	  been	   constantly	  diminishing	  during	   the	  past	  20	  years.	   Costs	   vary	  according	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  including	  the	  size	  of	  the	  turbine	  and	  wind	  availability.	  According	   to	   the	   IEA	   Wind	   Technology	   Roadmap,	   the	   life-­‐cycle	   cost	   of	   electricity	  generation	  from	  wind	  ranges	  from	  a	  low	  of	  70	  USD/MWh	  under	  the	  best	  circumstances	  to	  a	  high	  of	  130	  USD/MWh	  (IEA,	  2009).	  This	   is	   in	  contrast	   to	  coal	  plants,	  where	  costs	  range	  from	  20	  USD/MWh	  to	  50	  USD/MWh.	  Gas-­‐fired	  electricity	  costs	  range	  between	  40	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USD/MWh	  and	  55	  USD/MWh	  and	  nuclear	  electricity	  costs	  range	  between	  20	  USD/MWh	  and	  30	  USD/MWh	  (IEA,	  2005).	  	   Since	   wind	   power	   generation	   is	   not	   yet	   competitive	   with	   conventional	  technologies,	   the	   massive	   deployment	   of	   wind	   turbines	   across	   the	   world	   has	   been	  driven	  mainly	  by	  public	  policy	  support.5	  These	  include	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs,	  a	  guaranteed	  price	  at	  which	  electricity	  suppliers	  must	  purchase	  renewable	  electricity	  from	  producers	  and	  a	  popular	  measure	  implemented	  in	  European	  countries.	  Germany	  introduced	  an	  attractive	  feed-­‐in	   tariff	   for	   wind	   power	   in	   1990	   and	   wind	   power	   capacity	   increased	   by	   60%	  annually	   between	   1990	   and	   2001.6	   In	   the	   US,	   30	   States,	   including	   Texas,	   Florida	   and	  California,	   have	   adopted	  Renewable	   Portfolio	   Standards,	  which	   place	   an	   obligation	   on	  electricity	   supply	   companies	   to	   produce	   a	   specified	   fraction	   of	   their	   electricity	   from	  renewable	   energy	   sources.	   Other	   states	   have	   implemented	   investment	   tax	   credits,	  production	   tax	   credits,	   feed-­‐in	   tariffs,	   and	   tradable	   certificates.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   US	  represented	  26%	  of	  the	  wind	  capacities	  installed	  worldwide	  in	  2009.	  	  	   Several	  policies	  usually	  coexist	   in	  a	  given	   jurisdiction.	  For	   instance,	   in	  his	  study	  on	   the	  development	  of	  wind	  power	   in	  California,	  Nemet	   (2009)	   shows	   that	  up	   to	   four	  policies	  were	   in	  place	  at	   the	   same	   time	   in	   the	  1980s,	   including	   federal	   investment	   tax	  credit,	   oil	   windfall	   profits	   tax	   credit,	   the	   California	   alternative	   energy	   tax	   credit,	   and	  standard	   offer	   contracts.	   This	   has	   important	   methodological	   implications	   for	   the	  empirical	   study	  of	   innovation:	   estimating	   the	   specific	   impact	  of	   one	   component	  of	   the	  policy	  mix	  on	  innovation	  is	  hardly	  feasible.7	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  overcome	  this	  difficulty	  by	  focusing	   directly	   on	   the	   joint	   result	   of	   these	   policies;	   that	   is,	   annual	   wind	   power	  generation.	  	  
3	   Data	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Addressing	   the	   paper’s	   questions	   requires	   variables	   to	   measure	   innovation	   activity,	  international	  technology	  transfer	  and	  the	  stringency	  of	  wind-­‐power	  support	  policies.	  We	  rely	  on	  patent	  data	  for	  innovation	  and	  diffusion	  and	  on	  wind	  power	  generation	  data	  for	  the	  policy	  stringency.	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  justify	  these	  choices,	  describe	  data	  sources	  and	  give	  a	  first	  description	  of	  world	  innovative	  activity	  and	  technology	  transfer.	  
3.1	   Innovation	  and	  technology	  transfer	  We	   use	   the	   EPO	   World	   Patent	   Statistical	   Database	   (PATSTAT,	   2012)	   to	   extract	  information	  on	  patents	  granted	  in	  wind	  power	  technology	  worldwide	  between	  1991	  to	  2008	  (as	  well	  as	  citations	  made	  to	  these	  patents).	  To	  mitigate	  the	  well-­‐known	  problem	  that	  many	  patent	  applications	  are	  of	  very	   low	  value,	  our	  outcome	  measure	   focuses	  on	  patents	  that,	  after	  scrutiny,	  have	  been	  granted	  by	  the	  patent	  office.	  We	  need	  a	  truncation	  period	  to	  account	  for	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  for	  an	  patent	  application	  to	  be	  granted,	  so	  2008	  is	  our	   end	   year8.	   Our	   dataset	   includes	   16,649	   patents	   granted	   in	   84	   patent	   offices.9	   In	  PATSTAT,	  patent	  documents	  are	  categorised	  using	  the	  international	  patent	  classification	  (IPC)	   system.	   To	   select	   the	   patent	   related	   to	   wind	   power	   technologies,	   we	   follow	  Johnstone	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   and	   extract	   all	   patents	   included	   in	   the	   "F03D"	   group,	   which	  covers	  "wind	  motors".	  A	  recent	  study	  by	  the	  UK	  intellectual	  property	  office	  showed	  that	  this	  category	   includes	  96%	  of	  all	  wind-­‐power	  related	  patents	  and	  therefore	  accurately	  covers	  wind	  technology10	  (Buchanan	  and	  Keefe,	  2010).	  Since	  we	  are	  primarily	  interested	  in	   the	   influence	   of	   public	   policies	   (including	   public	   R&D	   expenditures)	   on	   private	  innovation	  activity,	  we	  exclude	  patents	  filed	  by	  public	  research	  institutions.	  We	  use	  the	  ECOOM-­‐EUROSTAT-­‐EPO	  PATSTAT	  Person	  Augmented	  Table	  (EEE-­‐PPAT,	  2012)	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  public	  research	  institutions	  among	  patent	  applicants.	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Importantly,	   the	  same	  invention	  may	  be	  patented	  in	  several	  countries.	  This	  could	  lead	  to	  double-­‐counting	  of	  some	  inventions.	  However,	  once	  patent	  protection	  has	  been	  requested	   in	   one	   country,	   subsequent	   patents	   covering	   the	   same	   invention	   in	   other	  countries	  must	  designate	  the	  original	  patent	  as	  their	  "priority	  patent".	  The	  set	  of	  patents	  covering	   the	  same	   invention	   in	  several	   countries	   is	   referred	   to	  as	  a	  patent	   family.	  Our	  measure	  of	  innovation	  is	  thus	  based	  on	  counts	  of	  patent	  families.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  avoid	  issues	  with	  double	  counting.	  Every	   patent	   includes	   information	   about	   the	   inventor,	   including	   their	   country	   of	  residence.	   We	   use	   this	   information	   to	   determine	   where	   each	   innovation	   was	  developed.11	   If	   a	   Canadian	   researcher	   working	   in	   a	   US-­‐based	   lab	   files	   a	   patent,	   this	  invention	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  US.12	  Patent	  data	  have	  been	  extensively	  used	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  innovation	  in	  the	  recent	  empirical	   literature	  (Popp	  2002,	  2006;	   Johnstone	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Aghion	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  The	  advantages	   and	   the	   limitations	   of	   this	   indicator	   have	   been	   discussed	   at	   length	   in	   the	  literature	   (see	   Griliches	   1990,	   and	   OECD	   2009	   for	   an	   overview).	   One	   of	   the	   main	  limitations	  is	  that	  the	  value	  of	  individual	  patents	  is	  highly	  heterogeneous.	  As	  explained	  above,	   to	  mitigate	   this	   problem	   our	   outcome	  measure	   focuses	   on	   granted	   patents,	   as	  opposed	  to	  the	  more	  expansive	  category	  of	  all	  patent	  applications.13	  Citation	  data,	  which	  has	  been	  widely	  used	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  control	  for	  the	  quality	  of	  patents,	  is	  also	  used	  to	  address	  this	  issue.	  With	  this	  method,	  patents	  are	  weighted	  by	  the	  number	  of	  times	  each	  of	  them	  is	  cited	  in	  subsequent	  patent	  applications	  (see	  Trajtenberg	  1990;	  Lanjouw	  et	  al.	  1998;	   Harhoff	   et	   al.	   1999;	   Hall	   et	   al.	   2005).	   We	   implement	   this	   method	   to	   construct	  quality-­‐weighted	  knowledge	  stocks	  available	  to	  inventors	  (see	  below)14.	  	  It	   should	   also	   be	   emphasised	   that	   patents	   fail	   to	   capture	   informal	   modes	   of	  innovation	   through	   “learning-­‐by-­‐doing”,	   which	   may	   be	   particularly	   important	   in	   the	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wind	   sector	   (Hendry	   and	   Harborne	   2011).	   This	   is	   not	   without	   consequence	   for	   our	  analysis	   as	   demand-­‐pull	   policies	   arguably	   have	   a	   higher	   impact	   on	   learning-­‐by-­‐doing	  than	  public	  support	  for	  R&D.	  	  Patent	   data	   is	   also	   used	   to	  measure	   technology	   flows	   across	   countries.	   Patents	  indicate	   not	   only	   the	   countries	   where	   inventions	   are	   developed,	   but	   also	   where	   the	  patent	  owner	   intends	   to	  use	   the	  patented	   technology.	  Because	  patents	   are	   granted	  by	  national	  patent	  offices,	   inventors	  must	  file	  a	  patent	  in	  each	  country	  in	  which	  they	  seek	  protection.	  An	  advantage	  of	  using	  an	  international	  patent	  database	  is	  thus	  that	  for	  every	  patented	   innovation	   in	   the	   world,	   we	   know	   where	   it	   was	   invented	   and	   the	   set	   of	  countries	   where	   it	   was	   filed.	   These	   features	   make	   it	   possible	   for	   us	   to	   analyse	   the	  diffusion	   of	   inventions	   because	   holding	   a	   patent	   in	   a	   country	   gives	   the	   holder	   the	  exclusive	   right	   in	   that	   country	   to	   exploit	   the	   technology	   commercially.	   The	   count	   of	  patents	  filed	  in	  country	  j	  by	  inventors	  located	  in	  country	  i	  (and	  subsequently	  granted	  by	  the	  patent	  office	  in	  country	   j)	   is	  thus	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  size	  of	  transfers	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	   This	   way	   of	   measuring	   international	   technology	   flows	   has	   been	   used	   for	  example	  by	  Eaton	  and	  Kortum	  (1996,	  1999)	  and	  more	  recently	  by	  Dekker	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  and	   Dechezleprêtre	   et	   al.	   (2012).	   Although	   we	   restrict	   our	   focus	   on	   granted	   patents,	  patents	   are	   counted	   by	   the	   year	   of	   their	   application,	   as	   the	   date	   of	   grant	   is	   mostly	  determined	  by	  administrative	  idiosyncrasies	  of	  the	  various	  patent	  offices.	  Using	   patents	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	   technology	   diffusion	   is	   not	  without	   drawback.	  For	   instance,	   a	   patent	   grants	   the	   exclusive	   right	   to	  use	   the	   technology	  only	   in	   a	   given	  country;	   however,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   patent	   owner	   will	   actually	   use	   the	  technology	   in	   that	   country.	   This	   limitation	   could	   significantly	   bias	   our	   results.	   For	  example,	   if	   applying	   for	  patent	  protection	  did	  not	   cost	   anything,	   then	   inventors	  might	  patent	   widely	   and	   indiscriminately.	   However,	   in	   practice	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	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Dechezleprêtre	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   show	   that	   the	   average	   invention	   is	   patented	   in	   only	   two	  countries15.	   Patenting	   is	   costly,	   in	   both	   the	   preparation	   of	   the	   application	   and	   the	  administration	  associated	  with	  the	  approval	  procedure	  (see	  Helfgott	  1993).	  In	  addition,	  possessing	  a	  patent	  in	  a	  country	  is	  not	  always	  in	  the	  inventor’s	  interest	  if	  that	  country’s	  enforcement	   is	   weak.	   Additionally,	   publication	   of	   the	   patent	   in	   a	   local	   language	   can	  increase	   vulnerability	   to	   imitation	   (see	   Eaton	   and	   Kortum	   1996,	   1999).	   Therefore,	  inventors	   are	   unlikely	   to	   apply	   for	   patent	   protection	   in	   a	   country	   unless	   they	   are	  relatively	   certain	   of	   the	   potential	  market	   for	   the	   technology	   covered.	   Finally,	   because	  patenting	  protects	  an	  invention	  only	  in	  the	  country	  where	  the	  patent	  is	  filed,	  inventors	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  strategic	  behavior	  to	  protect	  their	  inventions	  and	  prevent	  the	  use	  of	  their	  technology	  in	  the	  production	  of	  goods	  imported	  by	  foreign	  competitors	  into	  their	  domestic	  markets.	  
3.2	   Demand-­‐pull	  policies	  A	  major	   practical	   difficulty	   in	   cross-­‐country	   empirical	   studies	   on	   environmental	  innovation	  is	  finding	  data	  that	  are	  reliable	  and	  comparable	  across	  countries	  to	  act	  as	  a	  proxy	   for	   the	   level	   of	   demand-­‐pull	   regulation.	  Many	   country-­‐specific	   studies	  measure	  the	  level	  of	  regulation	  with	  pollution	  abatement	  and	  control	  expenditures	  (PACE),	  which	  are	   collected	   through	   surveys	   in	   various	   countries.	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   survey	  methodologies	  and	  the	  precise	  scope	  of	  PACE	  vary	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another.	  An	  attractive	  proxy	   for	   the	   strictness	  of	  policies	  promoting	   the	  demand	   for	  wind	  innovation	   is	   the	   annual	   added	  wind	   power	   capacity	   in	   each	   country.	   This	   variable	   is	  used	  by	  Peters	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  in	  their	  analysis	  of	  innovation	  in	  the	  photovoltaic	  industry	  and	   is	   available	   from	   the	   International	   Energy	   Agency	   (IEA)	   Renewables	   information	  database	   for	  OECD	   countries.16	   The	  main	   limitation	   of	   this	   variable	   is	   that	   data	   is	   not	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readily	   available	   for	   developing	   countries.	   For	   non-­‐OECD	   countries,	   the	   IEA	   only	  provides	   data	   on	   energy	   production	   from	   wind	   power	   but	   not	   on	   installed	   capacity.	  However,	  capacity	  and	  generation	  are	  strongly	  correlated	  (the	  correlation	  coefficient	  is	  0.98	  for	  OECD	  countries).	  We	  thus	  use	  annual	  added	  wind	  power	  production	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  level	  demand-­‐pull	  policies.17	  This	   approach	   is	   similar	   to	   using	   PACE.	   Environmental	   regulation	   leads	   to	  investments	   in	   pollution	   abatement	   devices,	   which	   are	   measured	   by	   PACE.	   Similarly,	  national	  energy	  policies	  induce	  new	  investments	  in	  wind	  energy,	  which	  are	  reflected	  by	  added	   power	   capacity	   (and	   thus	   increased	  wind	   power	   generation).	   The	   difference	   is	  that	  PACE	  is	  expressed	  in	  monetary	  units,	  whereas	  wind	  power	  generation	  is	  expressed	  in	  megawatt-­‐hour	   (MWh).	   The	   production	   of	   wind	   electricity	   in	   any	   given	   country	   is	  mostly	   attributable	   to	   government	   regulation,	   as	   its	   generation	   cost	   has	   been	  significantly	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  conventional	  electricity	  during	  the	  time-­‐period	  covered	  by	  our	  analysis	   (see	  Neuhoff	  2005,	  and	   IEA	  2003).	  Moreover,	  most	  policy	   instruments	  used	  to	  promote	  wind	  energy	  directly	  target	  electricity	  generation:	  for	  instance,	  a	  feed-­‐in	  tariff	  consists	  in	  a	  subsidy	  per	  kWh	  generated;	  renewable	  portfolio	  standards	  require	  electricity	   producers	   to	   supply	   a	   certain	   minimum	   share	   of	   their	   electricity	   from	  designated	  renewable	  resources.	  It	  remains,	  however,	  that	  wind	  power	  generation	  not	  only	  reflects	  policy	  strictness,	  but	  captures	  also	  a	  number	  of	  different	  factors,	  notably	  climatic	  conditions	  and	  country	  size.	  This	  does	  not	  pose	  any	  problem	  if,	  when	  interpreting	  the	  results,	  we	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  power	  generation	  is	  not	  a	  direct	  indicator	  of	  the	  policy	  strictness,	  but	  captures	  the	  size	  of	   the	  demand	   induced	  by	  policies.	  To	  a	   large	  extent,	   the	   same	   remark	  applies	   to	  previous	   studies	   that	   rely	   on	   PACE	   to	   act	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   regulation.	   Note	   that	   to	   the	  extent	  that	  such	  non-­‐policy	  factors	  influencing	  the	  demand	  size	  are	  country-­‐specific	  and	  
 13 
do	  not	  vary	  over	   time,	   they	  are	   controlled	   for	  by	   country	   fixed	  effects	   included	   in	  our	  analysis.	  
3.3	   A	  first	  description	  of	  global	  innovation	  and	  technology	  diffusion	  In	  this	  subsection,	  we	  highlight	  some	  features	  of	  the	  data	  and	  provide	  some	  preliminary	  evidence	   on	   the	   influence	   of	   foreign	   markets	   on	   innovators.	   Figure	   1	   compares	   the	  trends	  in	  innovation	  activity	  with	  additional	  wind	  generation	  between	  1991	  and	  2008.	  Annual	  global	  patenting	  activity	  for	  wind	  power	  technology	  increased	  ten	  folds	  between	  1991	  and	  2008.	  Acceleration	  in	  innovation	  activity	  occurred	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  again	  in	  2005.	  Meanwhile,	  additional	  generation	  increased	  dramatically	  from	  332	  GWh	  in	  1991,	  to	  48,403	  GWh	  in	  2008.	  At	  the	  global	  level,	  the	  correlation	  between	  added	  wind	  generation	   and	   innovation	   is	   striking.	   Determining	   whether	   this	   evolution	   indicates	  simple	  correlations	  or	  causations	  is	  an	  objective	  of	  our	  empirical	  analysis.	  Public	  R&D	  expenditure	  for	  wind	  in	  OECD	  countries	  (available	  from	  the	  IEA	  energy	  information	  database)	  increased	  but	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent.	  They	  increased	  by	  93%	  between	  1991	  and	  2008;	  i.e.,	  from	  115	  million	  USD	  to	  223	  million	  USD.	  	  	  
	  




	  The	  data	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  foreign	  markets	  matter	  for	  inventors:	  49%	  of	  the	  patents	  in	   the	  data	   set	  are	   filed	  by	   inventors	  whose	  country	  of	   residence	   is	  different	   from	   the	  country	   in	   which	   protection	   is	   sought.18	   "International"	   inventions	   (i.e.	   inventions	  patented	   in	   several	   countries)	   are	  on	  average	  patented	   in	  4.7	   countries	   (including	   the	  country	   of	   origin).	   Interestingly,	   the	   proportion	   of	   international	   inventions	   tripled	  during	  the	  1990s.	  	   Table	  1	  shows	  the	  share	  of	  patents	   filed	  abroad	  for	  the	  10	  main	  OECD	  inventor	  countries.	  The	  rate	  of	  export	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  share	  of	  the	  country’s	  inventions	  that	  are	  patented	  in	  at	  least	  one	  foreign	  country.	  The	  rate	  varies	  widely	  across	  countries:	  nearly	  70%	  for	  US	  inventions,	  around	  50%	  for	  European	  countries,	  and	  only	  10%	  for	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Share	  of	  patents	  also	  filed	  abroad	  for	  the	  10	  main	  OECD	  inventor	  








































Country	   Export	  rate	  
	   	  Canada	   44.8%	  France	   31.8%	  Germany	   49.0%	  Japan	   11.0%	  Netherlands	   61.4%	  S	  Korea	   11.7%	  Spain	   57.7%	  Sweden	   66.7%	  UK	   45.5%	  USA	   68.7%	  	   	  
	  
	  
4	   Analytical	  framework	  and	  hypotheses	  In	   this	   section,	  we	   formulate	  and	   justify	  on	   theorectical	   grounds	   the	  assumptions	   that	  will	   be	   tested	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   paper.	   Technology	   development	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	  process	  where	  an	  innovation	  is	  made	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  and	  disseminated	  in	  the	  second	  stage.	   As	   innovators	   are	   forward	   looking	   –	   they	   anticipate	   what	   will	   happen	   at	   the	  second	   stage–,	   we	   need	   to	   reason	   backward	   by	   analyzing	   first	   diffusion	   to	   properly	  understand	  innovation	  decisions	  as	  usually	  done	  when	  analyzing	  sequential	  games.	  At	   the	   diffusion	   stage,	   increasing	   the	   generation	   of	   wind	   electricity	   in	   a	   country	  raises	  the	  local	  demand	  for	  wind-­‐powered	  electric	  generating	  sets.	  As	  technology	  is	  an	  input	  to	  the	  production	  of	  wind	  equipment,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  more	  inventions	  are	  made	  available	   in	   countries	   with	   stricter	   demand-­‐pull	   policies.	   This	   leads	   to	   a	   first	  assumption:	  
• Assumption	   D1:	   The	   increase	   of	   wind	   power	   generation	   in	   a	   country	   raises	  technology	  inflows.	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While	   almost	   all	   patented	   inventions	   are	   filed	   in	   the	   inventor’s	   country,	   Section	   4.2	  shows	  that	  foreign	  patenting	  only	  occurs	  in	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  countries.	  This	  suggests	  the	   existence	   of	   barriers	   to	   international	   transfer,	   which	   reduce	   the	   potential	   size	   of	  foreign	  demand	  for	  technologies.	  This	  has	  been	  long	  recognised	  by	  the	  general	  literature	  on	  the	  economics	  of	  technology	  diffusion	  (see	  Keller	  2004,	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  survey).	  This	   literature	   identifies	   three	   main	   channels	   of	   diffusion.	   The	   first	   channel	   is	  international	   trade	   in	   goods.	   The	   idea	   is	   that	   certain	   goods	   embody	  new	   technologies	  which	  a	  country	  can	  access	  through	  imports.	  This	  applies	  particularly	  to	  capital	  goods,	  such	   as	   machinery	   and	   equipment.	   The	   second	   channel	   of	   international	   technology	  diffusion	   is	   foreign	   direct	   investment	   (FDI):	   multinational	   enterprises	   transfer	   firm-­‐specific	   technology	   to	   their	   foreign	  affiliates	  or	   to	   joint-­‐ventures.	  The	   third	   channel	   of	  technology	  diffusion—and	  the	  most	  direct—is	   licensing.	  That	   is,	  a	   firm	  may	   license	   its	  technology	   to	   a	   company	   abroad	   that	   uses	   it	   to	   upgrade	   its	   own	   production.	   This	  suggests	  that	  the	  strictness	  of	  intellectual	  property	  (IP)	  law	  and	  the	  height	  of	  barriers	  to	  trade	  and	  to	  FDI	  are	  important	  drivers	  of	  international	  technology	  transfer:	  
• Assumption	  D2:	   Stricter	   IP	   rights	   in	   the	   recipient	   country	   increase	   technology	  inflows.	  
• Assumption	   D3:	   Lower	   barriers	   to	   trade	   in	   the	   recipient	   country	   increase	  technology	  inflows.	  
• Assumption	   D4:	   Lower	   barriers	   to	   FDI	   in	   the	   recipient	   country	   increase	  technology	  inflows.	  Moving	   backward	   to	   innovation,	   deriving	   assumptions	   is	   straightforward	   once	   we	  recognize	   that	   innovation	   is	   centrally	   driven	   by	   expectations	   about	   diffusion.	  Assumption	  D1	  on	  demand	  and	  Assumptions	  D2-­‐4	  on	  the	  potential	  existence	  of	  barriers	  to	  international	  technology	  transfer	  imply	  the	  following	  three	  hypotheses:	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• Assumption	  I1:	  The	  addition	  of	  wind	  power	  generation	  in	  the	  inventor’s	  country	  induces	  more	  innovation	  by	  local	  inventors.	  
• Assumption	   I2:	   The	   addition	   of	   wind	   power	   generation	   abroad	   induces	  more	  innovation	  by	  local	  inventors.	  
• Assumption	   I3:	   The	   marginal	   impact	   on	   domestic	   innovation	   of	   foreign	   wind	  power	   generation	   is	   lower	   than	   the	   marginal	   impact	   of	   domestic	   wind	   power	  generation.	  	  
5	   The	  analysis	  of	  cross-­‐border	  technology	  diffusion	  We	  now	  develop	  an	  empirical	  strategy	  to	  investigate	  these	  assumptions.	  We	  start	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  international	  technology	  diffusion	  (Assumptions	  D1-­‐4).	  	  






















j ,t−1 + a6 lngdpj ,t + a7 lnNi,t−1 + ηi,j + βTt + νi,j ,t )
	   (1)	  
In	  this	  equation,	  demand
j ,t 	   is	   the	  demand	  for	  wind	  power	   in	  the	  recipient	  country	   j	   in	  year	  t	  as	  previously	  described.	  
,ln j ttrade 	   is	  the	  trade	  flow	  of	  wind	  power	  devices	  from	  country	   i	   to	   country	   j.	   This	   data	   was	   extracted	   from	   the	   COMTRADE	   database	  (COMTRADE,	  2012).19	   ,j tfdi 	  is	  an	  index	  which	  measures	  the	  stringency	  of	  international	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capital	  market	  control	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF,	  2012).	  The	  IMF	  reports	  on	  up	  to	  13	  different	  types	  of	  international	  capital	  controls.	  The	  zero-­‐	  to-­‐10	   rating	   is	   the	   share	   of	   capital	   controls	   levied	   as	   a	   share	   of	   the	   total	   number	   of	  capital	   controls	   listed	   multiplied	   by	   10.	   ,j tipr 	   is	   the	   index	   developed	   by	   Park	   and	  Lippoldt	   (2008)	   that	   measures	   the	   stringency	   of	   the	   intellectual	   property	   regime	   in	  country	  j	  at	  time	  t.	  	  In	   addition,	   we	   add	   several	   control	   variables.	   Ki,t	   is	   the	   discounted	   stock	   of	  citation-­‐weighted	   wind	   patents	   previously	   filed	   by	   inventors	   from	   country	   j.	   More	  specifically,	  we	  have:	  
	   Ki,t = (1 − δ )k
k=1
∞
∑ Pi,t−k 	  with	   Pj ,t−k ,	  the	  number	  of	  citation-­‐weighted	  patents	  granted	  in	  year	  t	  –	  k	  in	  the	  recipient	  country	   j.	   In	  the	  literature,	  this	  is	  a	  usual	  proxy	  for	  the	  stock	  of	  knowledge	  available	  at	  year	  t	  (see	  for	  instance	  Popp	  2002,	  2006	  and	  Peri	  2005).	  This	  allows	  controlling	  for	  past	  supply	   and	   demand	   factors	   and	   local	   absorptive	   capacities.	   We	   set	   the	   value	   of	   the	  discount	  factor	  δ	  at	  15%,	  a	  value	  commonly	  used	  in	  the	  literature,	  and	  conduct	  tests	  to	  show	  that	  the	  results	  are	  not	  sensitive	  to	  using	  other	  values	  of	  δ.	  To	  weight	  patents	  by	  
citations,	  we	  simply	  use	  Pi,t = (1 +Cikt )
k
∑ 	  where	  Cikt	  is	  the	  number	  of	  forward	  citations	  (excluding	  self-­‐citations)	  received	  by	  patent	  k	  invented	  in	  country	  i	  in	  year	  t	  within	  five	  years	   after	   its	   publication.20	   When	   a	   patent	   has	   multiple	   family	   members,	   we	   count	  citations	  to	  every	  member	  of	  the	  family.	  
, 1ln i tN − 	   is	   the	   (log)	   number	   of	   granted	   patents	   in	   the	   inventor	   country	   i.	   This	  measures	  the	  number	  of	  inventions	  available	  for	  export.	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   We	  decompose	   the	  error	   term	   into	  a	   country-­‐pair	   fixed	  effect	   ( ,ηi j ),	   a	   vector	  of	  time	   dummies	   Tt	   and	   an	   error	   term	   that	   is	   uncorrelated	   with	   the	   right-­‐hand	   side	  variables	  (𝜈!,!,!).	  Country-­‐pair	  fixed	  effects	  control	  for	  any	  time-­‐invariant	  differences	  in	  country	  and	  country-­‐pair	  characteristics.	  
5.2	   Sample	  description	  Our	   panel	   runs	   from	   1991	   to	   2008	   and	   includes	   28	   inventor	   countries	   which	   export	  inventions	  to	  74	  recipient	  countries.	  This	  represents	  2,072	  country	  pairs.	  Note	  that	  since	  we	  use	  a	  fixed-­‐effects	  estimator	  the	  final	  estimation	  samples	  include	  fewer	  country-­‐pairs	  because	  the	  number	  of	  patent	  transfers	  between	  some	  country	  pairs	  is	  always	  equal	  to	  zero.	   The	   descriptive	   statistics	   for	   the	   variables	   used	   in	   the	   analysis	   are	   presented	   in	  Table	  2.	  	  	  
Table	  2.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  	  
Variable	   Mean	   Std	  deviation	   Min	   Max	  
, ,i j tn 	   0.18	   1.65	   0.00	   83.67	  
lndemand
j ,t
	   1.50	   2.31	   0.00	   9.96	  
lntrade
i,j ,t








	   4.98	   3.03	   0.00	   10.00	  
, 1ln j tK − 	   1.64	   1.90	   0.00	   7.51	  
, 1ln i tN − 	   7.28	   16.89	   0.00	   128.00	  
	   	   	   	   	  	  	  
5.3	   Results	  Results	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  3.	  Column	  1	  estimates	  a	  Poisson	  model	  while	  column	  2	  uses	  a	  negative	  binomial	  estimation.	  The	  results	  appear	  to	  confirm	  our	  assumptions.	  To	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begin	   with,	   diffusion	   is	   positively	   influenced	   by	   additional	   wind	   generation	   in	   the	  recipient	  country:	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  local	  demand	  in	  country	  j	  induces	  a	  0.7%	  increase	  in	   the	   number	   of	   patents	   transferred	   from	   country	   i.	   This	   result	   shows	   that	   foreign	  demand	   has	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   diffusion	   of	   technologies.	   In	   section	   6,	   we	   investigate	  whether	  this	  translates	  into	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  development	  of	  new	  technologies.	  We	  also	  show	  that	  technology	  transfer	  is	  positively	  influenced	  by	  stricter	  IP	  rights	  and	  by	  larger	  trade	  flows	  from	  the	  inventor	  country	  to	  the	  recipient	  country.	  Increasing	  the	  zero-­‐to-­‐ten	  rating	  of	  IPR	  strictness	  in	  the	  recipient	  country	  by	  one	  unit	  induces	  between	  11%	  and	  29%	  more	  patent	  imports.	  The	  associated	  elasticity	  is	  0.75	  (i.e.,	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  IPR	  strictness	  induces	  a	  7.5%	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  patents	  transferred).	  A	  10%	  increase	  of	   trade	   flows	  entails	   less	   than	  0.3%	  additional	   imported	  patents.	  Barriers	   to	  foreign	  direct	   investment	   in	   the	   recipient	   country	   lower	   the	   incentive	   to	   transfer	  new	  technologies,	   but	   the	   magnitude	   of	   the	   effect	   is	   smaller	   than	   that	   of	   patent	   rights:	  increasing	   the	  zero-­‐to-­‐ten	  rating	  of	  capital	  market	  controls	   in	   the	  recipient	  country	  by	  one	   unit	   reduces	   patent	   flows	   by	   5%	   to	   6%	   and	   the	   associated	   elasticity	   is	   0.07.	  Absorptive	   capacity	   reflected	   by	   the	   variable	   , 1ln j tK − 	   also	   raises	   the	   inward	   flows	   of	  technology.	   This	   effect	   is	   large:	   a	   10%	   increase	   in	   (quality-­‐weighted)	   local	   knowledge	  stock	  raises	  patent	  flows	  by	  1.7%	  to	  2.1%.	  Having	  established	  that	  there	  are	  barriers	  that	  hinder	  the	  international	  transfer	  of	  wind	  inventions,	  we	  assess	  in	  the	  next	  section	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  barriers	  dampen	  the	  effect	  of	  foreign	  demand	  on	  innovation	  relative	  to	  domestic	  demand.	  	  
Table	  3	  —	  Estimation	  results	  of	  the	  diffusion	  equation	  
	   	   	  	   (1)	   (2)	  




	   0.0724***	   0.0715***	  
(0.0175)	   (0.0124)	  
lntrade
i,j ,t
	   0.0232*	   0.0161**	  




	   0.2905***	   0.1157***	  




	   -0.0527**	   -0.0660***	  
(0.0274)	   (0.0139)	  
, 1ln j tK − 	   0.2150*	   0.1778***	  (0.1306)	   (0.0340)	  
, 1ln i tN − 	   0.0135***	   0.0102***	  (0.0015)	   (0.0011)	  Country-­‐pair	  FE	   	   	  yes	   yes	  Year	  dummies	   yes	   yes	  Observations	   8434	   8434	  Country	  pairs	   469	   469	  	   	   	  	   	   	  Note:	   *=significant	   at	   the	   10%	   level,	   **=significant	   at	   the	   5%	   level,	   ***=significant	   at	   the	   1%	  level.	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  number	  of	  patents	  transferred	  from	  country	  i	  to	  country	  j	  in	  year	  t.	  Column	  1	  is	  estimated	  by	  Poisson	  conditional	  ML	  with	  fixed	  effects	  with	  standard	  errors	  clustered	   by	   country	   pair	   in	   parentheses.	   Column	   2	   is	   estimated	   by	   a	   fixed	   effects	   negative	  binomial	  conditional	  ML	  model.	  	  	  
6	   The	  analysis	  of	  innovation	  
6.1	   Econometric	  framework	  We	  measure	  country	  i’s	  innovation	  output	  in	  year	  t	  by	  Ni,t,	  the	  number	  of	  inventions	  for	  which	  private	  inventors	  from	  country	  i	  have	  sought	  patent	  protection.21	  As	  Ni,t	  is	  a	  count	  variable,	  we	  adopt	  the	  following	  reduced	  form	  specification:	  
	   Ni,t = exp(α1 lndemandi,t + α2 lndemand-i,t + β lnrdi,t−1+γ 1 lnKi,t−1 + γ 2 lnK−i,t−1 + ηi + ρTt + εi,t ) 	   (2)	  In	   this	   equation,	   the	   two	   key	   variables	   derived	   from	  Assumptions	   I1-­‐3	   are	   demand
i,t
	  
which	   is	   the	   domestic	   demand	   in	   country	   i	   in	   year	   t	   and	   demand−i,t 	   which	   describes	  foreign	  demand	   in	  countries	  other	   than	   i.	  We	  return	   to	   the	  description	  of	   the	  variable	  
demand−i,t 	  in	  the	  next	  subsection.	   rdi,t−1 	  is	  the	  value	  of	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  year	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t-­‐1	   in	   country	   i.	  
 
K
i,t−1 	   is	   the	   discounted	   stock	   of	   citation-­‐weighted	   wind	   patents	  previously	  granted	  to	  inventors	  from	  country	  i.	   − −, 1i tK 	  is	  the	  stock	  of	  patents	  granted	  to	  inventors	  from	  all	  other	  countries.	  We	  include	  this	  variable	  to	  control	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  cross-­‐country	  knowledge	   spillovers.	   iη 	   are	   country	   fixed	  effects	  which	   control	   for	   any	  time-­‐invariant	   differences	   in	   countries’	   characteristics	   (such	   as	   wind	   availability	   and	  public	   attitude	   towards	   wind	   technology)	   that	   may	   influence	   their	   innovation	  performance	   and	   for	   cross-­‐country	   differences	   in	   the	   propensity	   to	   use	   patents	   as	   a	  means	  of	  protecting	  new	  inventions.	   tT 	  is	  a	  full	  set	  of	  time	  dummiers	  and	   ,i tε 	  a	  random	  noise	  that	  is	  uncorrelated	  with	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  variables.	  	  Note	  that	  all	  explanatory	  variables	  are	  expressed	  in	  natural	  logarithms	  in	  the	  estimation,	  so	  that	  coefficients	  can	  be	  easily	  interpreted	  as	  elasticities.	  	  We	   now	   discuss	   in	   greater	   detail	   how	  we	   construct	   the	   policy	   variables	   and	   identify	  methodological	  pitfalls.	  
Domestic and foreign demand for wind power (demand
i,t  and 
demand−i,t )  These	   variables	   deserve	   three	   remarks.	   First,	   there	   might	   be	   a	   problem	   of	  endogeneity.	  Inventions	  in	  the	  field	  of	  wind	  energy	  are	  developed	  in	  order	  to	  cut	  wind	  energy	  production	  costs,	  hence	  stimulate	  the	  production	  of	  wind	  electricity.	  In	  our	  case,	  this	  problem	  is	  limited	  as	  the	  variables	  describes	  current	  generation	  whereas	  innovation	  may	  only	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  future	  generation.	  The	  second	  remark	  pertains	  to	  the	  rationality	  of	  innovators.	  If	  they	  are	  rational,	  they	  base	  their	  decisions	  on	  expectations	  about	  future	  demand.	  A	  practical	  problem	  is	  that	  we	  do	  not	  observe	  expected	  demand.	  The	  data	  only	  describe	  actual	  wind	  power	  generation.	  To	  overcome	  this	  difficulty,	  one	  can	  assume	  that	  innovators	  form	  adaptive	  expectations	  based	  on	  past	  observations,	  as	  is	  done	  in	  Popp	  (2002).	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  adaptive	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expectations	   model	   is	   only	   able	   to	   produce	   an	   estimate	   of	   generation	   in	   year	   t	   +	   1,	  whereas	   innovators	   obviously	   look	   beyond	   that	   date.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   this	   model	  yields	  a	  formula	  where	  expected	  demand	  in	  year	  t	  +	  1	  is	  given	  by	  a	  weighted	  sum	  of	  past	  demand.	  As	   annual	   generation	   is	   increasing	  quickly	  over	   the	  period	  1991	   -­‐	  2008,	   it	   is	  doubtful	   that	   past	   power	   generation	   constitutes	   a	   better	   predictor	   of	   expected	  generation	   than	   current	   generation.	   This	   reasoning	   has	   led	   us	   to	   keep	   using	   the	  contemporaneous	  generation	  variables	  demand
i,t 	  and	  demand−i,t .	  The	  last	  remark	  specifically	  concerns	  the	  foreign	  variable	  demand−i,t .	  A	  simple	  way	  to	  measure	  the	  demand	  for	  wind	  power	  abroad	  is	  to	  sum	  the	  demand	  in	  the	  n	  –	  1	  foreign	  countries:	  
≠
∑ ,ijt j t
j i
w demand 	  








where	   nˆ 	  is	  the	  value	  of	  the	  patent	  transfer	  between	  a	  country	  pair	  predicted	  by	  the	  diffusion	  model	  for	  an	  average	  observation	  (that	  is,	  holding	  all	  explanatory	  variables	  at	  their	  means).	   nˆi,j ,t 	   	   is	  similar	  except	  that	  we	  take	  the	  observation-­‐specific	  value	  for	  the	  three	   variables	   describing	   potential	   barriers:	  
, , , ,, , andi j t j t j ttrade fdi ipr .	   The	   weights	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approximate	   the	   height	   of	   barriers	   to	   technology	   transfer	   related	   to	   the	   IP	   regime,	  restrictions	   on	   trade	   and	   on	   foreign	   direct	   investments.	   Thus,	   a	   country	   with	   high	  barriers	  will	  be	  given	  a	  low	  weight,	  while	  a	  country	  with	  low	  barriers	  (whose	  market	  is	  thus	  more	  easily	  accessible	  by	  foreign	  inventors)	  will	  be	  given	  a	  high	  weight.	  A	  side	  benefit	  of	  introducing	  different	  weights	  is	  to	  mitigate	  a	  possible	  identification	  problem.	  By	   construction,	   the	   unweighted	   version	   of	   the	   variable	   demand−i,t 	   does	   not	  vary	   much	   in	   a	   cross-­‐section	   of	   countries:	   It	   is	   the	   sum	   of	   all	   countries'	   demand	  worldwide,	   which	   is	   common	   to	   all	   countries,	   minus	   demand	   in	   country	   i,	   which	   is	  country-­‐specific	  but	  usually	  much	  smaller	  than	  world	  demand.	  This	  potentially	  creates	  multicollinearity	   with	   year	   dummies	   used	   to	   control	   for	   unobserved	   time-­‐varying	  factors.	  Compared	  to	  the	  unweighted	  sum,	  the	  weighted	  variable	  has	  the	  advantage	  that	  it	  varies	  much	  more	  across	  the	  cross-­‐section	  dimension.	  The	  drawback	  is	  that	  the	  coefficient	  obtained	  for	  the	  weighted	  version	  of	  
- ,i tdemand 	  is	  much	  harder	  to	  interpret.	  It	  does	  not	  directly	  reflect	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  foreign	  market,	  but	   rather,	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   fraction	   of	   the	   foreign	   market	   that	   we	   assume	   by	  construction	   to	  have	   an	   influence	  on	   inventors.	  The	   results	   section	  below	  will	   discuss	  the	  sign	  and	  significance	  of	  the	  coefficients	  on	  the	  weighted	  variable.	  However,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  determining	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effects,	  it	  is	  the	  size	  of	  the	  coefficient	  on	  the	  unweighted	  variable	  that	  will	  be	  of	  primary	  interest.	  
R&D public support (
 
rd
i,t−1 )  In	   line	  with	  previous	   studies,	  we	  use	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  at	  year	   t	   -­‐	  1	   to	  explain	  innovation	  in	  year	  t	  (see	  Popp	  2002;	  Johnstone	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Verdolini	  and	  Galeotti	  2009).	  Data	  on	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  is	  available	  from	  the	  IEA	  energy	  information	  database.	  
 
rd
i,t−1 	   could	  pose	   a	   simultaneity	  problem	  as	  domestic	  R&D	  expenditures	   are	   inputs	   of	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the	   innovation	   process,	   which	   leads	   to	   new	   patents	   at	   home,	   in	   particular	   in	  organisations	   that	   receive	  public	  R&D	  money.	   This	   endogeneity	   concern	  has	   led	  us	   to	  exclude	   patents	   filed	   by	   public	   organisations	   from	   the	   dependent	   variable.	   But	   this	  might	  not	  be	  sufficient	  as	  public	  R&D	  expenditures,	  as	  reported	  by	  the	  IEA,	  also	  consist	  of	   tax	   credits	   on	   private	   R&D	   expenditures.	   We	   address	   this	   issue	   by	   using	   an	  instrumental	   variables	   approach	   in	   alternative	   specifications	   (see	   Appendix).	   We	   use	  annual	  R&D	  public	  expenditures	  in	  solar	  and	  hydro	  power	  in	  the	  same	  country	  and	  year	  as	   instruments.	  R&D	  expenditures	   in	   these	  domains	  present	   the	  necessary	  properties.	  First,	  they	  do	  not	  directly	  influence	  the	  number	  of	  wind	  patents	  as	  they	  differ	  from	  wind	  energy	   from	  a	   technological	   point	   of	   view.	   Second,	   they	   are	  positively	   correlated	  with	  




	  on	  the	  instrumental	  variables	  and	  the	  exogenous	  variables	  in	  Eq.	  (2)	  
using	  a	  log-­‐linear	  estimation,	  and	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  we	  include	  the	  residual	  of	  the	  first	  stage	   estimation	   as	   an	   additional	   regressor	   in	   Eq.	   (2).	   Schlenker	   and	   Walker	   (2011)	  provide	  a	  recent	  application.	  	   We	  do	  not	  include	  public	  R&D	  support	  in	  foreign	  countries	  in	  the	  equation.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  foreign	  public	  R&D	  cannot	  have	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  innovation	  as	  subsidies	  are	   obviously	   not	   granted	   to	   foreign-­‐based	   inventors.	   It	   might	   indirectly	   influence	  innovation	  through	  internation	  knowledge	  spillovers.	  But	  this	  effect	  is	  controlled	  for	  by	  the	  foreign	  knowledge	  stock	   − −, 1i tK .	  
6.2	   Sample	  description	  	   The	  panel	  is	  balanced	  and	  extends	  over	  18	  years,	  from	  1991	  to	  2008.	  It	  covers	  28	  
 26 
OECD	  countries.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  for	  the	  variables	  used	  in	  the	  analysis	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  4.	  	  
Table	  4—Descriptive	  statistics	  Variable	   Definition	   Mean	   Std	  dev.	   Min	   Max	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
,i tN 	   Number	  of	  patents	  developed	  in	  country	  i	  in	  year	  t	  and	  granted	   7.81	   17.40	   0.00	   128.00	  
lndemand
i,t
	   Domestic	  demand	   2.87	   2.64	   0.00	   9.96	  
−, 1i trd 	   Public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  country	  
i	  in	  year	  t-­‐1	  (million	  USD)	   8.52	   1.48	   5.24	   10.79	  
, 1i tK − 	   Discounted	  stock	  of	  previously	  granted	  patents	  (citation-­‐weighted)	   9.93	   1.74	   5.93	   13.58	  
lndemand−i,t 	   Unweighted	  foreign	  demand	   0.13	   1.85	   -­‐2.30	   4.15	  	   Weighted	  foreign	  demand	   3.02	   2.02	   0.00	   7.51	  
, 1i tK− − 	   Discounted	  stock	  of	  previously	  granted	  patents	  (citation-­‐weighted)	  in	  foreign	  countries	   8.20	   0.43	   7.33	   8.84	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  
6.3	   Results	  Estimation	   results	   are	   shown	   in	  Table	   5.	  As	   can	  be	   seen	   from	  Table	  4,	   the	  dependent	  variable	   is	   overdispersed,	   hence	   a	   negative	   binomial	   model	   is	   used	   in	   our	   main	  estimations.	   We	   estimate	   by	   unconditional	   maximum	   likelihood.22	   Because	  unconditional	   maximum	   likelihood	   estimation	   may	   be	   subject	   to	   the	   incidental	  parameter	  problem	  (Greene	  2004	  a,	  b),	  we	  re-­‐estimate	  all	  our	  equations	  as	  a	  robustness	  test	  using	  a	  simpler	  Poisson	  model	  with	  the	  conditional	  maximum	  likelihood	  approach	  introduced	  by	  Hausman	  et	  al.	  (1984)	  (see	  Appendix).	  Table	   5	   displays	   the	   results	   of	   the	   two	   models.	   The	   models	   vary	   in	   the	   way	   foreign	  variables	  are	  included	  (weighted	  or	  unweighted).	  In	  column	  (1),	  the	  foreign	  demand	  is	  left	   unweighted.	   All	   three	   domestic	   variables	   enter	   with	   a	   positive	   and	   significant	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coefficient,	   which	   is	   consistent	   with	   our	   hypotheses:	   (i)	   stricter	   domestic	   demand	   (a	  proxy	  for	  demand-­‐pull	  policies)	  fosters	  innovation	  in	  wind	  power	  technology;	  (ii)	  higher	  public	   R&D	   expenditures	   increase	   private	   innovation;	   and	   (iii)	   a	   larger	   stock	   of	  knowledge	   available	   to	   inventors	   stimulates	   faster	   innovation	   in	   wind	   power	  technologies.	   In	   addition,	   we	   find	   that	   foreign	   demand	   has	   a	   positive	   impact	   on	  innovation.	  The	  effect	  is	  strongly	  significant	  (p-­‐value=0.018).	  This	  suggests	  that	  foreign	  demand	  also	  matters	  for	  innovators.	  	  In	   column	   (2),	   foreign	   demand	   enters	   in	   its	   weighted	   specification.	   We	   again	   find	  evidence	  that	  foreign	  demand	  positively	  influences	  innovation.	  The	  effect	  is	  still	  strongly	  significant.	  	  A	  key	  conclusion	  emerges	  from	  Table	  5:	  the	  demand	  for	  wind	  power	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  fosters	  innovation	  in	  wind	  power	  technology.	  Importantly,	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  A1	  (Appendix),	   this	   result	   is	   robust	   across	   various	   specifications.	   The	   point	   estimates	  obtained	   for	  domestic	   and	   foreign	  demand	  variables	   (both	  weighted	  and	  unweighted)	  are	  remarkably	  stable	  and	  always	  statistically	  significant.	  	  
Table	  5	  —	  Estimation	  results	  







demand	  	   	   	  	   	   	  
lndemand
i,t
	   0.0575**	   0.0491***	  
(0.0248)	   (0.0163)	  
lndemand−i,t (unweighted)	   0.6495**	   	  (0.2756)	   	  
− ,ln i tdemand 	  (weighted)	   	   0.5491***	  	   (0.1678)	  
 
lnrd
i,t−1 	   0.1619**	   0.1441**	  (0.0801)	   (0.0799)	  
, 1ln i tK − 	   0.3843***	   0.3264***	  (0.1084)	   (0.1154)	  
, 1ln i tK− − 	   -1.6170	   -1.2893	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(1.2400)	   (0.8774)	  	   	   	  Country	  FE	   yes	   yes	  Year	  dummies	   yes	   yes	  Observations	   502	   502	  Countries	   28	   28	  	   	   	  	  Note:	   *=significant	   at	   the	   10%	   level,	   **=significant	   at	   the	   5%	   level,	   ***=significant	   at	   the	   1%	  level.	   The	   dependent	   variable	   is	   the	   number	   of	   inventions	   in	   all	   columns.	   All	   columns	   are	  estimated	   by	   negative	   binomial	   unconditional	   ML	   with	   country	   dummies.	   Standard	   errors	  clustered	  by	  country	  in	  parentheses.	  	  We	  now	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  magnitudes	  of	  the	  effects.	  Since	  all	  our	  right-­‐hand	  side	  variables	  are	  expressed	  in	  natural	  logs,	  the	  coefficients	  can	  be	  easily	  interpreted	  as	  elasticities.	  We	  find	  that	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  domestic	  demand	  induces	  a	  0.5%	  increase	  in	  innovation	  while	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  foreign	  demand	  increases	  innovation	  by	  5.5	  to	  6.5%.	  This	  does	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  as	  the	  size	  of	  the	  overall	  foreign	  market	  is	  on	  average	  30	  times	  larger	  than	  the	  domestic	  market.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that,	  in	  their	  study	  of	  the	  solar	  PV	  sector,	  Peters	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  find	   that	   the	  coefficient	  on	   foreign	  demand	   is	  –	  except	   in	  one	  model	  –	  not	   statistically	  higher	  than	  the	  coefficient	  obtained	  for	  domestic	  demand,	  whereas	  it	  is	  ten	  times	  larger	  (and	   always	   statistically	   significantly	   so)	   in	   this	   paper.	   This	   suggests	   that	   barriers	   to	  technology	  diffusion	  might	  be	  higher	  in	  the	  solar	  PV	  industry,	  or	  that	  companies	  place	  a	  higher	  priority	  on	  meeting	  domestic	  demand	  in	  this	  relatively	  less	  mature	  technology23.	  If	   we	   now	   calculate	   the	   marginal	   effect	   of	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   demand	   at	   the	  sample	  mean,	  we	   find	  that	  an	  additional	   typical	  20	  MW	  wind	   farm24	   installed	  at	  home	  induces	   0.210	   additional	   domestic	   private	   inventions,	   whereas	   the	   same	   wind	   farm	  installed	  abroad	  only	  increases	  that	  number	  by	  around	  0.016.25	  Hence	  whilst	  a	  spillover	  effect	   exists,	   we	   estimate	   that	   the	   marginal	   effect	   of	   demand	   for	   wind	   power	   on	  innovation	  is	  12	  times	   larger	  within	  national	  borders,	   than	  across	  borders.	  Our	  results	  clearly	   show	   that	   –	   whathever	   the	   exact	   magnitude	   of	   this	   difference	   –	   the	   marginal	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effect	  of	  domestic	  demand	  is	  much	  stronger	  than	  that	  of	  foreign	  demand.	  This	  suggests	  that	   the	   barriers	   to	   technology	   diffusion	   identified	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   discourage	  inventors	  from	  considering	  foreign	  markets	  as	  a	  potential	  outlet	  for	  their	  technology.26	  The	  difference	  in	  marginal	  effects	  suggests	  that	  barriers	  to	  diffusion	  are	  high.	  Importantly,	   however,	   each	   wind	   farm	   installed	   abroad	   induces	   around	   0.016	  invention,	   but	   this	   effect	   occurs	   in	   27	   countries	   (all	   the	   28	   countries	   of	   the	   dataset	  except	   the	   one	   where	   the	   wind	   farm	   is	   installed).	   Hence,	   one	   should	   multiply	   these	  figures	  by	  27	   to	  obtain	   the	  overall	   impact	  of	   foreign	   installations	   in	  OECD	  countries.27	  This	  leads	  to	  0.452	  invention	  induced	  abroad,	  which	  is	  twice	  as	  higher	  as	  the	  number	  of	  inventions	   generated	   at	   home	   (0.210).	   Again,	   the	   exact	   numbers	   do	   not	  matter	  much	  here,	   but	   they	   suggest	   that	   demand-­‐pull	   policies	   have	   a	   higher	   aggregate	   impact	   on	  foreign	  innovation	  than	  on	  domestic	  innovation.	  Turning	   next	   to	   the	   impact	   of	   public	   R&D,	   Table	   5	   shows	   that	   a	   10%	   increase	   in	  domestic	  public	  expenditures	  increases	  local	  innovation	  by	  around	  1.5%.	  The	  marginal	  effect	  of	  1	  million	  USD	  lies	  in	  between	  0.28	  invention	  in	  column	  2	  and	  0.36	  in	  column	  1.	  However,	   although	   the	   results	   are	   consistent	   across	   specifications	   (see	   table	   A1	   in	  Appendix),	   the	   size	   of	   the	   coefficient	   varies	   much	   more	   than	   those	   obtained	   for	   the	  demand	  variables,	  in	  particular	  when	  we	  implement	  an	  instrumentation	  strategy	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  potential	  endogeneity	  of	  public	  R&D.	  Therefore	  we	  caution	  against	  inferring	  too	  much	  of	  the	  marginal	  effect	  of	  public	  R&D	  expenditures.	  With	   respect	   to	   the	   local	   stock	   of	   knowledge,	   the	   coefficient	   is	   positive	   and	  significant	   as	   expected.	  The	  models	   estimate	   elasticities	  between	  0.32	   to	  0.38.	   From	  a	  policy	  point	  of	  view,	  this	  means	  that	  demand-­‐pull	  policies	  and	  public	  R&D	  also	  increase	  innovation	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  through	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  stock	  of	  knowledge,	  which	  feeds	  into	   future	   innovation.28	   In	   contrast,	   the	   stock	   of	   foreign	   knowledge	   , 1ln i tK− − 	   is	   not	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statistically	   significant,	   confirming	   that	   knowledge	   spillovers	   have	   a	   strong	   local	  component	  (Jaffe,	  Trajtenberg,	  and	  Henderson	  1993;	  Peri	  2005).	  29	  	  
7	   Summary	  of	  the	  results	  and	  policy	  implications	  In	   this	   paper,	   we	   use	   patent	   data	   from	   OECD	   countries	   to	   analyse	   the	   relative	  influence	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy	  incentives	  for	  innovation	  activity	  in	  wind	  power	  generation	  technologies	  between	  1991	  and	  2008.	  	  We	  envision	   innovation	  as	  a	   two-­‐stage	  process,	  whereby	   inventors	  generate	  new	  technologies	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  and	  transfer	  the	  technologies	  to	  the	  countries	  where	  they	  plan	  to	  exploit	  them	  in	  the	  second	  stage.	  As	  innovators	  are	  forward	  looking,	  we	  analyse	  these	  two	  steps	  recursively.	  We	   first	   analyse	   the	   international	   diffusion	   of	  wind	  power	   patents.	  We	   find	   that	  local	   demand	   for	   wind	   power	   exerts	   a	   positive	   influence	   on	   technology	   inflows,	  providing	   evidence	   that	   foreign	   markets	   matter	   for	   inventors.	   However,	   barriers	   to	  trade,	   lax	   IP	   rights	   and	   strong	   controls	   over	   capital	   market	   significantly	   hinder	   the	  transfer	   of	   patented	   inventions.	   This	   indicates	   that	   foreign	  markets	   are	   likely	   to	   have	  less	  influence	  on	  innovation	  than	  domestic	  markets.	  We	   then	   estimate	   the	   relative	   impact	   of	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   demand	   for	   wind	  power	   on	   innovation	  with	   a	   panel	   covering	   28	  OECD	   countries	   over	   the	   period	  1991-­‐2008.	  We	   find	   that	   efforts	   to	  produce	  new	   innovations	   increase	   in	   response	   to	  higher	  domestic	   and	   foreign	   demand.	   This	   means	   that	   policies	   that	   drive	   demand	   for	   wind	  energy,	  such	  as	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs,	  induce	  innovation	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  However,	  the	  marginal	  effect	  of	  domestic	  demand	  on	  the	  rate	  of	  innovation	  is	  12	  times	  larger	  than	  the	  marginal	   effect	   of	   foreign	   demand.	   We	   attribute	   this	   difference	   to	   the	   barriers	   to	  technology	  diffusion.	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But	  the	  aggregate	  effect	  of	  foreign	  markets	  on	  innovation	  is	   larger:	  we	  find	  that	  a	  10%	  increase	   in	  domestic	  demand	  induces	  a	  0.5%	  increase	   in	   innovation	  while	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  foreign	  demand	  increases	  innovation	  by	  5.5	  to	  6.5%.	  This	  does	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  as	  the	  size	  of	  the	  overall	  foreign	  market	  is	  on	  average	  30	  times	  larger	  than	  the	  domestic	  market.	  Our	  paper	  has	  policy	  implications.	  In	  a	  hypothetical	  world	  where	  technologies	  could	  be	   transferred	   from	   one	   country	   to	   another	   without	   frictions,	   innovators	   would	   be	  equally	   influenced	   by	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   demand.	   Therefore,	   a	   consequence	   of	   our	  findings	   is	   that	   barriers	   to	   technology	   diffusion	   also	   discourage	   innovation,	   implying	  that	   lowering	   these	   barriers	   to	   diffusion	   constitutes	   a	   powerful	   policy	   leverage	   for	  boosting	  environmental	  innovation.	  Our	   paper	   also	   bears	   a	   finding	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   literature	   on	   directed	  technological	   change.	   The	   finding	   that	   domestic	   (policy-­‐induced)	   demand	   for	   wind	  energy	  has	  a	  larger	  aggregate	  effect	  on	  foreign	  innovation	  than	  on	  domestic	  innovation	  suggests	  that	  previous	  empirical	  studies,	  which	  only	  look	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  environmental	  policies	   on	   domestic	   innovation,	   may	   have	   significantly	   underestimated	   the	   overall	  impact	  of	  demand-­‐pull	  policies	  on	  innovation.	  From	  a	  global	  green	  growth	  perspective,	  the	   significant	   cross-­‐country	   spillovers	   of	   innovation	   uncovered	   in	   this	   study	   may	  reinforce	  the	  case	  for	  stronger	  environmental	  policies.	  	  




                                                
1 See, for example, President Obama's speech at the Massachussets Institute of Technology, October 23rd, 2010: 
“The world is now engaged in a peaceful competition to determine the technologies that will power 
the 21st century. (…). The nation that wins this competition will be the nation that leads the global 
economy. And I want America to be that nation.” Similar statements were made by political leaders in 
many countries. 
2 The restriction to OECD countries stems from the unavailability of data on public R&D expenditures for non-
OECD countries. For consistency we estimate the diffusion equation on the same sample. 
3 These are Sinovel, Goldwind, Dongfang, United Power (China) and Suzlon (India). The other companies in the 
top 10 in 2011 were Vestas (Denmark), GE (USA), Enercon and Siemens (Germany) and Gamesa 
(Spain). 
4 Peters et al. (2012) look at 15 OECD countries across 1978-2005, while we consider 28 OECD countries 
between 1991 and 2008. Furthermore, they distinguish between continental and intercontinental 
demand, while we aggregate both into foreign demand. 
5 An overview of the measures adopted by every country, including the timing of their adoption, is available 
from the IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures database, available at 
http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/renewableenergy/  (last accessed 1 July 2013). 
6 Most recently in July 2012, Japan introduced a feed-in tariffs scheme, obliging incumbent power companies to 
buy the output from solar, wind, geothermal, small hydro and some biogas and biomass-fueled plants 
at premium prices. 
7  Johnstone et al. (2010) is a notable exception. However, except for feed-in tariffs, they only measure the 
strictness of the different policy instruments by a binary variable, with one indicating that the 
particular instrument is in place. 
8 We use the October 2012 version of the PATSTAT database, and it takes on average 3 years for a patent to be 
granted. Note that our results are robust to changing the end year to 2007 or 2009. 
9 Note that Least Developed Countries are not present in our dataset, for two related reasons: their patenting 
activity is extremely limited, and available statistics are not reliable. 
10 In addition, we randomly sampled 100 patents from the F03D category and checked their relevancy based on 
title and abstract. We found only three irrelevant patents, which lead us to believe the patent 
classification is accurate for wind power technologies. 
11 For 1.4% of the patent applications included in our dataset, the inventor’s country of residence is not available. 
When this information is missing, we simply assume that the inventor’s country corresponds to the 
first patent office in which protection was taken (i.e. the priority office). 
12 Patents with multiple inventors are counted fractionally. For example, if two inventor countries are involved in 
an invention, then each country is counted as one half. 
13 Our results are robust to using all filed patent applications, however. 
14 Family size (the number of countries in which a patent is filed) is another way of assessing the value of a 
patent. But we think it is better to use patent citations in this particular paper, given the questions 
addressed. The problem is that family size is not only a value indicator; it also captures the degree of 
internationalization of the invention, which is, roughly speaking, the central topic of the paper. This 
suggests using family size as a dependent variable, not as a weight when constructing an independent 
variable. To a certain extent, this is what we do in section 5 where the dependent variable is the 
bilateral flow of patent between countries. 
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15 In fact, about 75% of inventions are patented in only one country. 
16 Available at http://data.iea.org/. 
17 An alternative option is to estimate installed capacity in non-OECD countries by running a regression of 
energy capacities on energy production using the data from OECD countries and then use this model 
to make out-of-the-sample predictions for capacities in non-OECD countries based on their 
production. We implemented this method, which gives qualitatively similar results. It however has 
two weaknesses: first, the relationship between capacity and production might differ between OECD 
and non-OECD countries; second, using predicted values would lead us to underestimate standard 
errors in the subsequent regression analysis. 
18 Excluding patents filed at the European Patent Office, the figure is 42%. 
19 We downloaded data on wind-power generating sets (product code HS 850231). 
20 More precisely we count all citations made by patents applied for up to five years after the publication of each 
patent. Note that PATSTAT includes citation information from 98 patent offices. 
21 As mentioned above, inventions patented in several countries are only counted once in order to avoid double-
counting. We restrict patent data to private inventions only to avoid potential endogeneity problems. 
22 In other words, we include a full set of country dummies in the estimation. Another way to deal with fixed 
effects would be to use the conditional maximum likelihood estimator introduced by Hausman et al. 
(1984) and available in STATA as the xtnbreg command. However this model is known to 
imperfectly control for fixed effects (Allison and Waterman 2002; Greene 2007; Guimaraes 2008). 
Another issue is that xtnbreg does not report any robust or clustered standard errors and the small size 
of our sample has not allowed us to compute bootstrapped standard errors. 
23 Recall however that differences in sample size and in the way explanatory variables are constructed make it 
difficult to accurately compare the results between the two papers (see note 4 above). 
24 See http://www.thewindpower.net/ (last accessed 24 May 2013). This corresponds to an annual production of 
37.4GWh. 
25 Recall that the value of patents is heterogeneous. Therefore, these figures describe the effect of policies on the 
average invention.  
26 Cognitive limitations of innovators could provide an alternative explanation: they simply ignore the 
installations of new wind farms in certain foreign countries, which lead them to infer that the demand 
is actually zero. Note this interpretation rests on a bounded rationality assumption: A rational decision 
maker under uncertainty will consider the expected size of the market derived from a prior subjective 
probability distribution. 
27 Note that multiplying the effect by 27 only yields the aggregate effect in OECD countries. We cannot calculate 
the effect of innovation in non-OECD countries as they are not included in the estimation sample. 
28 The size of this effect centrally depends on the value of the discount rate δ. With δ=0.15, the additional long 
term impact of both demand-pull policies and public R&D through increased knowledge stock is 
about one half of the short-term impact. 
29 Peri (2005) shows that only 12% of the knowledge created in a country spills over to foreign countries. 
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Appendix:	  Robustness	  checks	  A	  number	  of	  robustness	  tests	  were	  conducted	  and	  the	  main	  ones	  are	  reported	  below.	  
Poisson	  estimator	  As	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   negative	   binomial	   specification,	   we	   reestimate	   equations	  presented	   in	  Table	  5	  using	   conditional	  maximum	   likelihood	  Poisson	  with	   fixed	   effects	  (Hausman	  et	  al.	  1984).	  Results	  are	  closely	  similar	  (see	  Table	  A1,	  columns	  1	  and	  2).	  Most	  importantly,	   the	   foreign	   installations	   variable	   remains	   positive	   and	   highly	   statistically	  significant	  in	  both	  specifications.	  
Accounting	  for	  the	  potential	  endogeneity	  of	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  The	  variable	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   on	   the	  
                                                1	  This	   is	   the	  reason	  why	  we	  did	  not	  use	  R&D	  expenditures	   in	  marine	  energy	  as	  an	   instrument.	  The	   technologies	   used	   for	   marine	   and	   wind	   energy	   production	   have	   some	   similarities.	   We	  considered	   adding	   public	   R&D	   expenditures	   in	   biomass	   and	   geothermal	   energy	   as	   additional	  instruments	  but	  none	  of	  them	  turned	  up	  significant.	  However,	  the	  results	  are	  completely	  robust	  to	  including	  them.	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   increase	   in	   both	   specifications.	  However,	   the	   coefficient	   on	   the	   residuals	   from	   the	   first	   stage	   equation	   are	   not	  significantly	  different	  from	  0,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  
 
lnrd
i,t−1 	   is	  exogenous	  cannot	  be	  rejected.	  Overall,	  results	  from	  these	  tests	  suggest	  that	  our	  baseline	  estimates	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  lower	  bound	  estimate	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  public	  R&D	  expenditures.	  Importantly,	   results	   concerning	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   demand	   are	   robust	   to	  instrumenting	  public	  R&D.	  	  
Other	  tests	  As	  is	  commonly	  the	  case	  with	  patent	  data,	  the	  distribution	  of	  patents	  across	  countries	  is	  highly	  heterogeneous,	  with	  a	  few	  countries	  accounting	  for	  a	  large	  share	  of	  innovations.	  For	   this	   reason,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   check	   that	   our	   results	   are	   not	   driven	   by	   outliers.	  Columns	  5	  and	  6	  of	  Table	  A1	  reports	  the	  results	  obtained	  when	  we	  drop	  Japan,	  by	  far	  the	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top	  inventor	  in	  our	  sample	  with	  35%	  of	  the	  total	  patented	  inventions.	  Our	  findings	  are	  robust,	  although	  the	  point	  estimate	  obtained	  on	  domestic	  installations	  decreases.	  Finally,	   applying	   alternative	   discount	   rate	   values	   which	   are	   used	   to	   calculate	   the	  knowledge	  stocks	  –	  specifically,	  10	  and	  20	  per	  cent	  –	  made	  no	  difference	  to	  the	  results	  (robustness	  test	  results	  not	  shown).	  	  
Table	  A1	  —	  Robustness	  tests	  




	   0.0800***	   0.0624***	   0.0523**	   0.0484***	   0.0427*	   0.0471***	  (0.0231)	   (0.0137)	   (0.0228)	   (0.0173)	   (0.0251)	   (0.0180)	  
 
lncap−i,t 	   0.6467***	   	   0.4759**	   	   0.5388*	   	  (0.1869)	   	   (0.2220)	   	   (0.2903)	   	  
 
lncap−i,t
w 	   	   0.5116***	   	   0.5514***	   	   0.5819**	  	   (0.1149)	   	   (0.1749)	   	   (0.2345)	  
 
lnrd
i,t−1 	   0.1473**	   0.1387*	   0.2641*	   0.2445**	   0.1653**	   0.1546*	  (0.0719)	   (0.0765)	   (0.1548)	   (0.1182)	   (0.0831)	   (0.0793)	  
, 1ln i tK − 	   0.5176***	   0.4434***	   0.3388***	   0.2733**	   0.3742***	   0.3131***	  (0.1157)	   (0.1082)	   (0.1131)	   (0.1203)	   (0.1070)	   (0.1145)	  
, 1ln i tK− − 	  
-­‐1.1597	   -­‐0.7941	   -­‐2.3714	   -­‐2.0960*	   -­‐1.5820	   -­‐1.8353**	  (1.0306)	   (0.9700)	   (1.6144)	   (1.0726)	   (1.4979)	   (0.8237)	  
, 1i tresid− − 	  
	   	   -­‐0.1091	   -­‐0.1060	   	   	  	   	   (0.1467)	   (0.1022)	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Country	  FE	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	  Year	  dummies	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	  Observations	   502	   502	   472	   472	   484	   484	  Countries	   28	   28	   28	   28	   28	   28	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  Note:	   *=significant	   at	   the	   10%	   level,	   **=significant	   at	   the	   5%	   level,	   ***=significant	   at	   the	   1%	  level.	  The	  dependent	  variable	   is	   the	  number	  of	   inventions	   in	  all	  columns.	  Columns	  1	  and	  2	  are	  estimated	  by	  Poisson	  conditional	  ML	  with	  fixed	  effects.	  Columns	  3	  to	  6	  are	  estimated	  by	  negative	  binomial	   unconditional	   ML	   with	   country	   dummies.	   Standard	   errors	   clustered	   by	   country	   in	  parentheses.	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Table	  A2	  —	  First	  stage	  equations	  












	   -­‐0.0054	   0.0079	  (0.0349)	   (0.0347)	  
 
lncap−i,t 	   -­‐0.5993	   	  (0.5261)	   	  
 
lncap−i,t
w 	   	   0.4926	  	   (0.4385)	  
 
lnrd
i,t−1 	   0.2595	   0.2130	  (0.2902)	   (0.2769)	  
 
ln Ki,t−1 	  
5.3232*	   6.1218***	  (2.7923)	   (2.0914)	  
 
ln K− i,t−1 	  
0.3446**	   0.3503**	  (0.1280)	   (0.1291)	  Country	  FE	   yes	   yes	  Year	  dummies	   yes	   yes	  Observations	   498	   498	  Countries	   28	   28	  R2	   0.823	   0.825	  	   	   	  	  Note:	   *=significant	   at	   the	   10%	   level,	   **=significant	   at	   the	   5%	   level,	   ***=significant	   at	   the	   1%	  level.	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  log	  of	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  wind	  power.	  All	  columns	  are	  estimated	  by	  OLS	  with	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  (clustered	  by	  country).	  The	  external	  instruments	  are	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  solar	  and	  hydro	  power.	  
